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DAMAGES AT THE BORDERS OF
LEGAL REASONING
DAVID CAMPBELL AND JAMES DEVENNEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Borders (U.K.) Ltd. and others v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis and another,1 the Court of Appeal has, yet again,
succumbed to the ‘‘temptation to do justice’’2 by further extending
to claimants a disgorgement remedy on the claimed authority of
A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party).3 We say ‘‘claimed
authority’’ because, yet again, the extension of the disgorgement
remedy is impossible to justify using legal argument respectful of
precedent, for such argument is subordinated to the direct ‘‘pursuit
of the justice of the outcome’’ ( para. [28]). The court frankly
acknowledged that its judgement ‘‘has to make up in justice what it
lacks in logic’’ ( para. [28]). As the court believed the case of the
second defendant (hereinafter the defendant) to be wholly
‘‘unembarrassed by any merits’’ ( para. [14]), ‘‘justice’’ appeared to
require that he be mulcted, and this is what the court has made it
possible for the claimant, with the particular assistance of the state
in this case, most thoroughly to do.
And, yet again, all this is unwise. The defendant, who received a
term of 30 months’ imprisonment for the oﬀences which gave rise
to this litigation, could not be said to be in the strongest position.
But as the court’s treatment of even this defendant is wholly
questionable as policy, the outcome the court has striven to
produce is bereft of justiﬁcation. If one leaves the shelter of
precedent to embark upon judicial legislation, one had better
identify the right policy. Why it has become quite common for
appeal court judges to believe they are able to perform the very
diﬃcult trick of legislation from the bench will not be discussed
here. What will be argued is that the Blake disgorgement remedy is
* Department of Law, University of Durham. We are grateful to Tang Chong Jun for research
assistance and to Don Harris and an anonymous reviewer for their comments.
1 [2005] EWCA Civ 197, [2005] All E.R. (D.) 60 (Mar). Unattributed references in parentheses
are to this case. This was a unanimous decision by May, Sedley and Rix L.JJ. in which the
principal judgement was given by Sedley L.J.
2 N. Andrews, ‘‘Civil Disgorgement of Wrongdoers’ Gains: The Temptation to do Justice’’ in
W.R. Cornish et al. (eds.), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Oxford 1998), ch. 10.
3 [1997] Ch. 84 (Ch. D.); [1998] Ch. 439 (C.A.); and [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.).
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a Trojan Horse which allows this way of deciding cases into the
law of damages. Or, to put the matter the other way around, the
Blake remedy is itself so wholly opposed to the balance and
cautious growth central to the common law of damages that it can
be advanced only by this sort of reasoning, which disdains the
‘‘straight-jacket’’ of precedent in order to give a decision which
serves ‘‘the interests of justice’’ ( para. [43]).
II. THE FACTS AND THE PROCEEDINGS4
On 16 January 2004, the defendant, Mr. Ronald Jordan, a street
trader, was convicted by Southwark Crown Court of conspiracy to
steal and of handling stolen goods. For at least three years
previously, Jordan had employed thieves to steal books from the
bookshops of inter alios the claimants, members of the Booksellers’
Association Loss Protection Consortium (BALPC), which he then
sold from street market stalls. Jordan appears to have organised the
theft of some 250,000(!) books, from the sale of which he made an
estimated annual proﬁt of over £300,000, of which over £600,000
was identiﬁed to him during the criminal proceedings.
Jordan was a brazen criminal. He constantly operated his
market stalls without licences and accepted consequent arrests and
ﬁnes as a cost of doing business (to the extent that he ever paid the
ﬁnes). He constantly attempted to evade payment of tax. He chose
for his thieves mainly drug addicts who, desperate for cash, would
sell him the books they had stolen for small sums by comparison to
the price for which he then sold them. It is only a certain sort of
person who would be able successfully to deal in ready cash with
drug addicts in this way, and Jordan used intimidation to assist
him in resisting investigation of the source of his stock (some of
which was obtained legally). But Jordan was no master criminal.
He eventually was imprisoned because he simply persisted in
foolishly ignoring the possibility of his ultimate conviction, and so
much of his proceeds remained to be identiﬁed to him because he
was an unsavoury man who, despite his wealth, continued to live in
repulsive squalor.
Criminal proceedings to conﬁscate (part of ) the £600,000 were
begun under sections 71 and 72AA of the Criminal Justice Act
1988.5 These were adjourned pending the outcome of the present
case. Also as part of the criminal proceedings, the claimants
4 In addition to the facts stated in Borders itself, we have read many newspaper, trade paper,
local authority and police accounts of Jordan’s career, the most full of which appears to be R.
Hanks, ‘‘Brought to Book’’ (9 March 2004) The Independent.
5 The Criminal Justice Act 1988, pt. 2 has been superseded by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
pt. 2.
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applied for a compensation order under section 130 of the Powers
of the Criminal Courts Act 2000. Subsequent to the assessment of
damages in the present, civil action, this application was
withdrawn.
For reasons which will not be discussed here, establishing the
evidence necessary to convict Jordan was extremely diﬃcult,
involving numerous frustrated attempts to prosecute him prior to
the ultimately successful one. The eventual securing of a conviction
required a very considerable eﬀort on the part of the claimants,
who had formed BALPC largely in the attempt to close down
Jordan’s operation, and who had to go to great lengths, such as
marking their stock with ultraviolet ink and having Jordan placed
under observation, to do so. It also required, in the words of the
criminal trial judge, ‘‘immense application’’ by the City of London
Police.6 We imagine, though it is not clear from the transcript, that
these circumstances played some part in the claimant framing what
appears to be a most conservative claim for compensatory
damages. The present action concerned only fewer than 50,000
books seized from Jordan’s stall, van, house and lock-up, and
Jordan’s claim that he had been running his operation for only
three years was accepted, as was police evidence which calculated
Jordan’s proﬁt per book at what appears to be a very low ﬁgure.
In the ﬁrst hearing of the present, civil action, the claimants
were awarded compensatory damages of £279,594.89 in total.
Ignoring a subsidiary component of this award, its bulk,
£233,143.25, was compensation for the conversion of 42,102 books,
assessed as the retail price of the books when stolen minus their
resale value when recovered. Though we shall comment on this use
of the retail price of the books below,7 we will eschew discussion of
the precise quantiﬁcation of the compensatory damages, which had
aspects which worked both for and against the defendant.
The present appeal turned on a further award of £100,000 in
exemplary damages. Master Leslie, assessing the compensatory
damages, undoubtedly believed that 42,102 books represented only
a fraction of the books Jordan had converted, and that he actually
made more proﬁt per book than the police evidence claimed.
Although he allowed Jordan credit for overheads, such as running
his van and lock-up, Master Leslie arrived at round ﬁgures of
£20,000, £30,000 and £50,000 as the net proﬁts from Jordan’s sales
of these books over three years, and awarded their sum of £100,000
6 Anon, ‘‘City Police Shut Down Book Theft Network’’ (6 February 2004) City of London Police
News and Events 5 http://www.cityoﬂondon.police.uk/news/2004/feb-6–04.html4 .
7 See the text accompanying note 59 below.
210 The Cambridge Law Journal [2006]
as exemplary damages. In justiﬁcation of this award, Master Leslie
said:
I am conﬁdent that [Jordan] earned a great deal more than
that . . . But I also bear in mind that there is an element of
punishment here—but it is not really punishment: it is intended
to be—and I think I am entitled to say this on the
authorities—a deprivation of wholly wrongfully obtained
proﬁt. That is the way the claim is put in the particulars of
claim and it is the way I have attempted to assess these
exemplary damages (quoted at para. [11]).
III. THE USE OF BLAKE
In Borders, even more than in Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX
Enterprises Inc., Edward Chalpin,8 it is not at all clear why the
claimant chose to state its claim in the, to quote the Court of
Appeal, ‘‘hazardous’’ way it did (para. [13]). Ignoring the marked
conservatism of the basic claim for compensatory damages, it
remains unclear why the claimant did not claim further
compensatory damages in respect of the books which were not
recovered. The argument need not be pursued at length because the
Court of Appeal told us that it would have succeeded had it been
used at ﬁrst instance (para. [13]), as the court believes it should
have been (para. [28]). If it had, then, of course, ‘‘the issue [of the
appeal] . . . need never have arisen’’ ( para. [12]).
There are two reasons why the course taken by the claimants
was so hazardous. First, as the criminal proceedings already
contemplated securing part or all of Jordan’s £600,000 by means of
conﬁscation and compensation, and as the Criminal Justice Act
1988, section 71(1C) permitted but did not require that sums
recovered from a defendant by civil action be set oﬀ against
conﬁscation proceedings, a civil award threatened to expose Jordan
to the ‘‘double jeopardy’’ ( para. [17]) of loss of the £100,000 twice
(para. [14]).9 This is not only abhorrent in principle but was
speciﬁcally disapproved in the important case of Archer v. Brown.10
For reasons which do not appear to be publicly available, but the
nature of which it is possible to imagine, the court has stated that
it could ‘‘conﬁdently anticipate that Mr. Jordan will not be mulcted
8 [2003] EWCA Civ 323, [2003] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 830.
9 And equally to, potentially, allow the claimants double recovery, on which see the text
associated with note 28 below.
10 [1985] Q.B. 401, 426. The Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary
Damages (Report No. 247, 1997) paras. 4.36–4.43 has queried the position set out in Archer v.
Brown, and, although the case is not discussed in this perfectly opaque part of the reasoning
in Borders, no doubt Borders will sanction such questioning.
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in the same sum twice’’ ( para. [17]).11 Whilst we ﬁnd this position
extremely unsatisfactory, we propose to leave it for discussion by
those more competent to deal with this latest blurring of the
criminal and the civil law, though undoubtedly the most important
aspect of this case is that it shows how much the appeal courts
currently are prepared to assist in this blurring.
The second reason why the claimants’ course was hazardous is
that it involves an extension of exemplary damages. For the
claimant to succeed, what should have been pleaded as
compensatory damages have to be recoverable as exemplary
damages, and one of the very few things one can say with
conﬁdence about the vexed topic of exemplary damages is that
there is no clear authority for this. The Court of Appeal states that:
‘‘The key issue is . . . whether there is today any room within the
concept of exemplary damages for quantiﬁed losses, or whether the
two are mutually exclusive’’ ( para. [18]), and draws on the
authority of Lord Nicholls in Kuddus v. Chief Constable of
Leicestershire Constabulary12 to say what is so uncontroversial as to
need no discussion here, that there is, ‘‘to all appearances, a
doctrine of mutual exclusivity’’ between compensatory and
exemplary damages, such that the latter are ‘‘additional to,’’ not
congruent with, the former (para. [22]).
The Court of Appeal also notes what is equally uncontroversial:
that in Rookes v. Barnard exemplary damages were identiﬁed as ‘‘an
anomaly’’ which it was regretted could not be abolished,13 and that
that case, reinforced by Broome v. Cassell and Co. Ltd.,14 sought to
conﬁne those damages to their scope in 1964. There now is, for
reasons which constraints of space prevent us from going into here,
academic argument for the extension of exemplary damages,
supported, after much thought, by the Law Commission,15 and
11 The court tells us that this means that ‘‘the probable practical relevance of the appeal is to
decide whether the £100,000 . . . goes to the . . . victims under the civil judgement or to the
state under the conﬁscation order’’ ( para. [46]). With respect, this does not explain the reasons
for the abandonment of the criminal proceedings for compensation. Under the Criminal
Justice Act 1988, as amended, a compensation order took precedence over a conﬁscation
order; the Crown Court could award an unlimited sum in compensation; and, despite his
sentence of imprisonment, Jordan had the means with which to meet a compensation order. It
would appear that the court has accepted that it was not possible to obtain more than
£233,143.25 through a criminal compensation order, where loss must be proven (R v. Watson
(1990) 12 Cr. App. R. (S) 508), and the court must not ‘‘simply pluck a ﬁgure out of the air’’
(R. v. Swann and Webster (1984) 6 Cr. App. R. (S) 22, 25, both cases interpreting legislation
from which The Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 2000, s. 130 is derived), and has turned to
the civil law because it would make a greater sum available to the claimant, as indeed it
would if the court’s treatment of exemplary damages were good law.
12 [2002] 2 A.C. 122, at paras. [50]–[52].
13 [1964] A.C. 1129, 1221, 1225–26.
14 [1972] A.C. 1027, 1082.
15 Law Commission, note 10 above, para. 1.14. The personal views of the Law Commissioner at
the time of the Report, Professor Burrows, tended towards the abolition of exemplary
damages: A. Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, 2nd ed. (London 1994),
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Kuddus, as we shall see, manages the extraordinary feat of arguing for
both the abolition and the extension of these damages.16 Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeal recognises that the English civil law displays an
antipathy to exemplary damages and particularly to their extension;
and this is, in our opinion,17 right as law and right as policy (if
abolition is not available).
The reader of the previous two paragraphs may, then, be
surprised to be told that the result of the Court of Appeal’s
judgement is that the claimants were able to recover the £100,000
as exemplary damages. The argument, so far as it may be rationally
reconstructed, is as follows.
By far the most important of the three ‘‘categories’’ of cases in
which Rookes v. Barnard allowed exemplary damages to be
awarded is the second identiﬁed by Lord Devlin: where the
defendant, with ‘‘a cynical disregard’’ for the claimant’s rights, ‘‘has
calculated that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing will
probably exceed the damages at risk.’’18 As Rookes v. Barnard was
decided in what now seems like a very remote world where a strong
distinction was drawn between criminal and civil law, a distinction
Rookes v. Barnard itself sought to strengthen,19 one might well
argue that the calculation one imagines Jordan made in respect of
the criminal oﬀences which led to this litigation does not ﬁt into
the second category, which Lord Devlin was prepared to accept did
not cover ‘‘malicious injuries to property’’ because such injuries
‘‘can generally be punished as crimes.’’20 But, although we shall say
a little more of the confusion of criminal and civil law in this case,
as Jordan’s cynical disregard for BALPC’s interests can hardly be
doubted, let us accept that Borders ﬁts into the second category of
exemplary damages.
As it was the case that the Court of Appeal believed the
£100,000 to be, in reality, compensatory damages, even if one
accepts that the £100,000 is the product of Jordan’s cynical
disregard, there still remains the question ‘‘of the calculus on which
the purportedly exemplary award was sought and made’’ ( para.
pp. 282–5 and A. Burrows, ‘‘Reforming Exemplary Damages: Expansion or Abolition’’ in P.
Birks (ed.), Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-ﬁrst Century (Oxford 1996), p. 153.
16 See the text accompanying note 30 below.
17 D. Harris et al., Remedies in Contract and Tort, 2nd ed. (London 2002), ch. 30.
18 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1227. Another formulation given in Broome v. Cassell
and Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, 1079 was that the defendant’s ‘‘prospects of material
advantage outweigh the prospects of material loss.’’
19 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1230 per Lord Devlin: ‘‘I do not care for the idea that in
matters criminal an aggrieved party should be given an option to inﬂict for his own beneﬁt
punishment by a method which denies to the oﬀender the protection of the criminal law.’’ See
also Broome v. Cassell and Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, 1087 per Lord Reid: ‘‘to allow pure
punishment in this way contravenes almost every principle which has been evolved for the
protection of oﬀenders.’’
20 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1221, 1230.
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[24]). Lord Devlin’s second category looks to give something
additional to render fruitless the defendant’s calculation about his
liability for compensation of the claimant’s loss. It was never
contemplated that compensatory damages as such would be
awarded as exemplary damages. The notion makes no sense in
terms of what we have previously understood of exemplary
damages. The Court of Appeal overcame this problem, to its own
satisfaction at least, by saying that what is really going on in Lord
Devlin’s second category is the prevention of unjust enrichment
(para. [25]). The court placed great reliance on comments which
can, in their diﬀering ways, be interpreted to this eﬀect in Lord
Diplock’s speech in Broome v. Cassell,21 and in Lord Scott’s speech
in Kuddus.22 But, in truth, the court does not seek to follow the law
but, though conscious it ‘‘is not a source of present law’’ (para.
[26]), to follow the argument of McGregor on Damages, that ‘‘the
real purpose behind this second common law category is not the
punishment of the defendant but the prevention of his unjust
enrichment.’’23 In sum, McGregor’s argument
helps to bring the two theories (of exemplary and
restitutionary damages) into a single frame by suggesting (as
Lord Scott suggested in Kuddus) that a modern enhanced
compensatory regime is capable of subsuming the need for
punitive awards. When one recalls that the rationale of the
second category of exemplary damages is, precisely, the
conﬁscation of proﬁts which cannot be got at through the
ordinary compensatory mechanisms, this is an attractive
synthesis ( para. [26]).
We do not pretend to be able to expound fully the chain of
reasoning the court thought it was setting out here, but wish to
make two points, not, in the ﬁrst instance at least, about this form
of reasoning, but about the substance of the position the court
takes up.24
21 [1972] A.C. 1027, 1129.
22 [2002] 2 A.C. 122, at para. [109].
23 17th ed. (London 2003), para. 11.027.
24 In a desperate attempt to preserve some order in our discussion of this convoluted and
confused case, we shall relegate to a footnote one other point of substance which might be
made. The Court of Appeal focusses on Lord Devlin’s categories test, but nowhere deals with
the problems that must be caused by the fact that, as no common law cases of exemplary
damages for conversion had been decided prior to Rookes v. Barnard, what the court does
contradicts Lord Devlin’s ‘‘cause of action’’ test. This test, an unsatisfactory compromise at
best, is probably outright indefensible in respect of conversion, for trespass to goods does
satisfy the cause of action test; and, anyway, after Kuddus, note 12 above, it would appear
that the cause of action test by no means absolute: cf. Banks v. Cox [2002] EWHC 2166, at
para. [13] on deceit, discussed by one of the current authors in J. Poole and J. Devenney,
‘‘Reforming Damages for Misrepresentation: The Case for Coherent Aims and Principles’’
[2006] J.B.L. (forthcoming). Largely disregarding the cause of action test, we shall consider
whether exemplary damages should be awarded.
214 The Cambridge Law Journal [2006]
The argument throughout Borders is that the £100,000 should
have been pleaded as compensatory damages. When it is awarded
on the Blake basis of disgorgement of enrichment by wrongdoing,
it is not awarded as compensatory damages at all. If we can be
excused for stating the obvious, the whole point of Blake is that the
disgorgement remedy it made available for breach of simple
contract is an alternative to compensatory damages because, it is
claimed, such damages are inadequate. In Borders, it is believed
that the claimants, even after receiving the £100,000, though better
compensated, will still be inadequately compensated. Is it to be the
case that, in future cases, disgorgement will be available only to
(partially) remedy otherwise inadequate compensatory awards, or
will the disgorgement remedy be available when compensation is
adequate or, because the claimant suﬀers no loss (e.g. trespass
which does not inﬂict damage to the land), damages are nominal?
We are faced with a recapitulation of the unresolved, and
unresolvable, dispute of whether what was done in Wrotham Park
Estate Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd.25 was a form of
compensation or a form of restitution.26 It was bad enough when
one did not know whether the compensatory or the restitutionary
measure, or both, should be available to claimants. Now, it seems,
compensation is available as restitution in the form of exemplary
damages, whatever this means; and in our opinion, given most
hesitantly, it means nothing. Even if it did mean something, the
problem set by Wrotham Park is increased. In addition to having to
ask which sort of case justiﬁes a departure from ‘‘axiomatic’’
compensatory damages,27 we now have to ask which sort of case
allows one to claim compensatory damages as ‘‘exemplary-
restitutionary’’ damages. It is evident that the Court of Appeal has
managed to do what one thought was impossible by increasing the
confusion that attends the distinction between ‘‘aggravated’’ (as
extra-compensatory) and ‘‘exemplary’’ (as punitive) damages. We
cannot say anything helpful about this.
It is also clear that, though the court was prepared to do more
or less anything to improve the claimants’ award by allowing ‘‘the
conﬁscation [sic] of proﬁts which cannot be got at through the
ordinary compensatory mechanisms’’ ( para. [26]), it did so only to
better approximate to the level of what the court believed to be the
claimants’ real loss. The court would not have awarded more than
a limit set by the claimants’ real loss, for such an award would be
25 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798.
26 Harris et al., note 17 above, pp. 258–62.
27 A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [1998] Ch. 439, 448 (C.A.); [2001] 1 A.C.
268, 282 (H.L.).
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a ‘‘double recovery’’ windfall to them (paras. [27], [43] and [47]).
But does this (ironically) mean that there is a cap on the
restitutionary recovery set by the limit of compensation of loss?
Ignoring the fact that this requires the court to maintain it knows
what this loss is (on other than the submitted evidence in support
of statements of claim which were not actually made), it is a
doctrinal development which will involve some diﬃculty, especially
in respect of what seem to be relevant discussions of expectation
ceilings in other areas of the law of damages.28
Notwithstanding what has just been said, perhaps the most
extraordinary aspect of what is being done is that the authorities to
which reference is made, even the persuasive authority of
McGregor, are all being turned against themselves by a Court of
Appeal which does not seem to realise what it is doing. The court
makes reference, as we have seen, to Lord Scott’s speech in Kuddus.
But in his speech his Lordship argued that, as, after Blake, ‘‘the
proﬁt made by a wrongdoer can be extracted from him’’ by
restitutionary damages, there no longer is any need ‘‘to rely on the
anomaly of exemplary damages.’’29 This is, to spell it out, an
argument that exemplary damages can be curtailed (on the way to
being dispensed with) if what Lord Devlin allowed under his
second category can be placed on a restitutionary footing. It is not
an argument that compensatory or restitutionary damages can be
placed on an exemplary footing! The court does not seem to
appreciate that the criticism of exemplary damages tout court is at
least as much to the fore in Kuddus30 as the criticism of the cause
of action test that, whilst right in itself, admittedly was bound to
have the opposite eﬀect to the abolition of those damages. But the
ambivalence of Kuddus can hardly be said to be characteristic of
Rookes v. Barnard or Broome v. Cassell, which, of course, as the
court ( para. [19]), and everybody else, perfectly well knows, display
a most grudging acceptance of exemplary damages. Nor is there
much doubt about the nature of the argument from McGregor
adopted by the court, for McGregor also seeks to diminish the
scope of exemplary damages, looking forward to ‘‘the day when
restitutionary damages will take over from Lord Devlin’s second
category and make it unnecessary.’’31 This really must be a case of
making the best of a bad lot, for McGregor also bitterly regrets
that it ‘‘reluctantly’’ now has to talk of ‘‘restitutionary damages’’ at
28 Harris et al., note 17 above, pp. 238–40.
29 [2002] 2 A.C. 122, at para. [109].
30 E.g. [2002] 2 A.C. 122, at para. [72].
31 McGregor, note 23 above, para. 11.046.
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all.32 In sum, even if one allows that interesting debate has been
joined over the possibility of a restitutionary reinterpretation of
Lord Devlin’s ‘‘cynical disregard’’ category,33 the Court of Appeal’s
use of Blake to expand the use of exemplary damages is, we are
reluctantly obliged to say, no more than an outre´ interruption of
this debate.
Perhaps it is wrong to dwell too long on the reasoning in
Borders. It is an evident hatchet-job, made, it would seem, to
ensure (after what the court seems to view as a questionable
statement of case supported by inadequate evidence) that the
defendant was punished and the claimants better compensated. And
if one has already decided that justice requires the mulcting of a
defendant in this way, then it would be a trivial accomplishment
for far less able ratiocinators than Court of Appeal judges to use
Blake to mulct him. The thrust of Blake is so ﬂatly towards the
prevention of wrongs that it has made it possible to require
disgorgement for simple breach of contract, the ‘‘wrong’’ for which
it is least appropriate to regard disgorgement as a default remedy,34
and so requiring disgorgement in other circumstances is child’s
play.
All equivocation aside, in the restitutionary jurisprudence of
Blake, wrongs are persuasively deﬁned as, precisely, wrong, and
corrective justice requires their prevention. Restitutionary damages
which will be larger than compensatory damages will be more likely
to prevent the wrong, with the complete disgorgement of the gains
the defendant makes by commission of the wrong which is
sanctioned by Blake being the logical apotheosis of the argument.
But the suggestion ‘‘that there is a universally applicable principle
that in every case there will be restitution of beneﬁt from a
wrong’’35 is a naı¨ve formalism which typically does not understand
32 Ibid., para. 12.004. And, with all respect to McGregor, it has failed to give suﬃcient weight to
a problem which, as one of the authors has already noted, attends its similar treatment of
Wrotham Park hypothetical release damages: D. Campbell, ‘‘The Extinguishing of Contract’’
(2004) 67 M, L.R. 818, 823 note 24. What if there is a cynical tort committed in the
expectation of proﬁt but the proﬁt does not in fact materialise? We do not doubt for a second
that the proponents of restitution are able to come up with something that suits the purpose,
indeed may already have done so; but will it improve our law to replace exemplary damages
with restitution of an unjust enrichment that does not enrich? This diﬃculty had been noted
in Broome v. Cassell and Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, 1130.
33 But see Design Progression Limited v. Thurloe Properties Limited [2004] EWHC 324, [2005] 1
W.L.R. 1, at para. [141] per Peter Smith J.: ‘‘[a]lthough it is clear that there was much debate
in the House of Lords in Kuddus as to whether or not the punitive role of exemplary
damages, in the case of the second limb, ought to be addressed more in restitutionary terms
(see paragraph 109 of the speech of Lord Scott of Foscote), it is clear that the existing basis
for the award of exemplary damages, namely to punish a wrongdoer for his conduct, remains
the law.’’
34 D. Campbell and D. Harris, ‘‘In Defence of Breach: A Critique of Restitution and the
Performance Interest’’ (2002) 22 L.S. 208.
35 Halifax Building Society v. Thomas [1996] Ch. 217, 227H.
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that there are excellent reasons why we do not even seek to prevent
some wrongs (e.g. breach of contract when damages are
adequate),36 and why we do not do everything in our power to
prevent wrongs which it would normally be better were prevented
(e.g. disclosure of conﬁdential business information).37 None of this
can be appreciated in, as Hegel would have put it,38 ‘‘the night in
which all cows are black’’ created by Blake’s blanket condemnation
of ‘‘wrongs.’’
IV. STILL NO TELLING
What is much harder than applying the Blake remedy is, having
got it to hand, developing a jurisprudence which allows one to
know when and when not to use it. One can always make an
argument for using it, as the Court of Appeal has facilely done in
Borders. What the court has failed to do is develop at all robust
rules for deciding when, as a matter of law rather than prior
intuition about what is just, the Blake remedy should or should not
be used.
We have been told that circumstances have to be ‘‘exceptional’’
to justify the Blake remedy,39 but we have no way of telling what
those circumstances are.40 One way which was canvassed by the
Court of Appeal which heard Blake is to focus on ‘‘the moral
calibre of the defendant’s conduct.’’41 That the breach was
‘‘deliberate and cynical,’’ or involved ‘‘skimping on performance’’
or ‘‘doing exactly what one promised one would not do,’’ were
advanced as circumstances justifying the alternative award.42 But
serious reﬂection shows that, for reasons which one of the present
authors has already discussed many times elsewhere and so will not
be recapitulated here,43 all of these are unsatisfactory reasons to
depart from compensatory damages, and there was a marked
hesitation about all of them in the House of Lords’ hearing of
Blake.44 They have surfaced in cases subsequent to Blake, but, in
the interests of coherent legal argument, they have no business
doing so.45
36 Campbell and Harris, note 34 above.
37 D. Campbell, ‘‘Hamlet without the Prince: How Leng and Leong Use Restitution to
Extinguish Equity’’ [2003] J.B.L. 131.
38 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford 1977), p. 9.
39 A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 285G (H.L.).
40 D. Campbell and P. Wylie, ‘‘Ain’t No Telling (Which Circumstances are Exceptional)’’ [2003]
C.L.J. 605.
41 A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [1998] Ch. 439, 456H (C.A.).
42 Ibid., pp. 457–8.
43 Harris et al., note 17 above, pp. 18–19, 213–14, 274–75, 200–8, 275–76.
44 A.G. v. Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd. Third Party) [2001] 1 A.C. 268, 277G, 291D (H.L.).
45 That the defendant ‘‘did the very thing it contracted not to do’’ was decisive in Esso
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. NIAD Ltd., unreported, 22 November 2001 (Ch.D.), at para. [60]. But it
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In Borders, it is the law of exemplary damages that furnishes the
grounds for the Blake award. ‘‘Exemplary damages,’’ we are told,
‘‘ﬁll a moral gap’’ ( para. [26]), and ‘‘can be awarded, ultimately in
the interests of justice, to punish and deter outrageous conduct on
the part of the defendant’’ ( para. [43]). So long as one’s own
interests are not at the mercy of this sort of stuﬀ, one can hardly
suppress a smile at the thought of turning to the law of exemplary
damages to assist the reﬁnement of our damages jurisprudence, but
let us examine what is involved. If, starting with Lord Devlin’s
second category, we are to base an extension of exemplary damages
on the ‘‘cynicism’’ of the defendant’s conduct, then surely Borders
creates the new problem that this runs completely counter to the
retreat from the ‘‘deliberate and cynical’’ ground by the House of
Lords in Blake!46 This obviously means that awarding a
disgorgement remedy, supposedly derived from Blake, as exemplary
damages on the supposed authority of Lord Devlin’s second
category, is quite contradictory. In sum, we can only repeat what
one of the current authors has already said of the law on this point
after Blake: that law is a dreadful mess, and nothing ultimately can
be done to straighten this mess out.47
For those who have reached this conclusion to advance further
comment on Blake can be justiﬁed only by their seeking to limit
the mischief that this case is causing, and it is to the speciﬁc
mischief in Borders that we now turn. To come to terms with
decisions like Borders, one is wise to abandon most of what one
knows of legal reasoning and simply recognise outright that the
court, because it believes it knows what is just for reasons, as it
were, prior to the decided law, has sought to mulct the defendant,
and Blake, which is based on a blanket repugnance of wrongdoing,
is just the tool for this job. Faced with this, the only way to
conduct a productive discussion of the detail of cases like Borders
is in Experience Hendrix LLC v. PPX Enterprises Inc, Edward Chalpin [2003] EWCA Civ 323,
[2003] 1 All E.R. (Comm.) 830, at para. [44] that some sort of measuring of the moral
turpitude thought to be involved in the wrongdoing has so far been most fully canvassed,
with George Blake’s treason the nadir to which the conduct of others could be compared.
Jordan’s criminality might be thought to give rise to the closest set of facts to Blake which
have so far arisen. But we are spared having to describe the diﬃculties of the moral
estimations called for in Hendrix because the court does not bother with them in Borders.
Having assumed that Jordan’s position does not have ‘‘arguments’’, it no doubt is diﬃcult to
consider whether, after all, there might not be a diﬀerence between Ronald Jordan’s
criminality and Blake’s treason, but we shall return to the nature of Jordan’s criminality
below.
46 Once again in an attempt to preserve order in our argument, we conﬁne to a footnote the
clash of the Court of Appeal’s approach in Borders with the Law Commission’s argument
(note 10 above, para. 1.52) for placing damages for ‘‘proprietary torts’’ such as conversion on
a restitutionary footing. A major advantage of so doing was claimed to be that it made it
possible to award damages in excess of the compensatory measure in the absence of
‘‘deliberate and outrageous conduct,’’ for ‘‘the basis of the restitutionary liability is strict.’’
47 Campbell and Wylie, note 40 above, p. 610.
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which purport to follow Blake is to put the damage to the rule of
law to one side and ask what is the merit as policy of what is
done?
V. FAGIN IN THE MODERN MANNER
It was inevitable that the Court of Appeal would take up the
popular description48 of Jordan as a ‘‘literary’’ Fagin (para. [1]), for
so, indeed, he was. But there is an irony in this description which
the court fails to appreciate. For Jordan was a ‘‘modern day’’49
Fagin in a strong sense, in that the rationale of his crime is
traceable to developments in the law around the time when, in
1838, Dickens published Oliver Twist. For the essential aspect of
Jordan’s crime was not that it involved theft, but that it involved
copyright. In 1838, prior to the Copyright Act 1842,50 eﬀective
copyright protection was vestigial by comparison to what now
exists,51 and Dickens himself felt suﬃciently angry about what he
believed to be the inadequate protection of his work that he
attacked the existing law in a famous passage of Nicholas
Nickleby.52 Dickens had an important role in the development of
modern copyright, for he successfully put his tremendous inﬂuence
particularly behind improving international protection (his sales in
the United States, and associated earnings particularly from reading
tours there, were very large).53 Things are rather diﬀerent now, and
Jordan’s operation was a response to the very extensive system of
copyright protection that now obtains.
The size and success of Jordan’s operation, and its longevity in
view of its size, are, on a ﬁrst look, remarkable. The Court of
Appeal states its view of the reason for this success brieﬂy: ‘‘Since
his overheads and outlays were somewhat less onerous than those
of a legitimate bookseller, Mr. Jordan made very considerable
proﬁts’’ ( para. [1]). This is, with all respect, an insuﬃcient
understanding of Jordan’s business to ground judicial legislation in
respect of the mischief it posed. In order to realise his proﬁts from
the stolen books, Jordan had to sell them, and this he had no
trouble whatsoever in doing. He was able to sell an average of 100
books a day, seven days a week, all the year round, for a number
48 Anon, ‘‘Book Theft Boss Must Pay Damages’’ (3 March 2005) BBC News 5http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/4314663.stm4 .
49 J. Davenport, ‘‘Rogue Trader Operated ‘Fagin’ Gang’’ (20 January 2004) This is London
[News and City Section] 5 http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/articles/86715944 .
50 5 and 6 Vic, c 45.
51 J. Feather, Publishing, Piracy and Politics (London 1994), ch. 5 and C. Seville, Literary
Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England (Cambridge 1999).
52 (London 1933), pp. 552–23.
53 A.J. Kappel and R.L. Patten, ‘‘Dickens’ Second American Reading Tour and His ‘Utterly
Worthless and Proﬁtless’ American Rights’’ (1978) 7 Dickens Studies Annual 1.
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of years. He is likely to have had tens of thousands of customers.
It cannot, therefore, be denied that there was a very strong demand
for what he was doing. This was so because the price of the books
when sold by members of BALPC, under protection of the
copyright monopoly, was much higher than the price which would
have been ﬁxed by competition.54 Jordan’s overheads and outlays
were indeed ‘‘less onerous’’ than those of the members of BALPC,
but the level of their overheads and outlays is set within a
framework in which the price competition which would drive that
level down is heavily restricted. For Jordan to undercut the price
charged by the members of BALPC was rather easy, and it is not
nearly enough to say that he did this only by illegal means, for
most price competition in bookselling would contravene the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
We hope to have made our opinion of Jordan’s personal
qualities clear. The point is that the current regulatory framework
makes it highly likely that only persons of his stamp will make
price competition the basis of their business should they engage in
bookselling. And as economic policy normally does not seek to
eliminate but to promote price competition because it is an
inestimable good, it is a signiﬁcant mistake to believe, as we have
seen the Court of Appeal centrally does believe, that even Jordan’s
position is wholly ‘‘unembarrassed by any merits’’ ( para. [14]).
Even in this case, it is not necessarily a question of continually
devising laws which ever more thoroughly mulct the defendant. It is
a question of balance.
Though it would seem that even our small competence to
discuss the law and economics of the book trade is greater than
that of the Court of Appeal, because, on the evidence of its view of
the nature of Jordan’s business, the court’s competence is zero, this
is not the place to do so. However, that the court has seen ﬁt to
engage in judicial legislation gives rise to two questions. The ﬁrst is:
is it sensible to grant a copyright monopoly which will be bound to
create a very substantial incentive to its infringement, and to
criminal acts if the infringement is deﬁned as criminal, or to
criminal acts pursuant to the infringement whether or not the
infringement is itself criminalised? The second is: is it sensible to
seek to extend criminal and civil remedies to make the monopoly
absolute? The economic and legal justiﬁcations for copyright in
general are wholly questionable,55 and the shape the industrial
54 We ignore the collective administration of prices central to the book trade until recently,
which was supposed to have come to an end with the abandonment of the Net Book
Agreement in 1995.
55 For the views of one of the present authors see S. Picciotto and D. Campbell, ‘‘Whose
Molecule Is It Anyway? Private and Social Perspectives on Intellectual Property’’ in A.
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organization of the book trade has taken under the inﬂuence of the
copyright monopoly is widely deprecated for its economic
shortcomings56 and its encouragement of philistinism.57 However,
the very existence of the statutory copyright regime, and a fortiori
its ﬂourishing state, makes it unproﬁtable to discuss the matter at
this fundamental level here; for our purposes, the existence of
copyright must be accepted. What can be discussed with proﬁt is
the extent of the protection that adjudication should recognise is
aﬀorded to the copyright monopoly and how this relates to what
was done in Borders.
The underlying moral atmosphere of Borders is a feeling that
something must be done ‘‘in the interests of justice’’ to prevent the
claimants being inadequately compensated. But the basic measure
of the compensatory damages awarded, of the retail value of the
books when they were stolen (minus their resale value when
recovered), though defensible as conversion damages, arguably itself
involves very considerable overcompensation. Had the claimants
merely replenished the books from the printers, the cost of doing so
would have been a small fraction of the resale value. We are not
arguing that the cost of replacement in this way is the right
measure of damages, but it is most important to see that what
really is at issue in Borders is not the conversion of the physical
books but the ‘‘conversion’’ of the revenues which accrue from the
copyright monopoly, and once this is acknowledged, then the
waters become very deep indeed. It is particularly unfortunate that
Borders proceeds without reference to the extensive criticism58 of
the punitive nature and excessive compensation involved in adding
conversion damages to other remedies (including compensatory
damages) for copyright infringement, which led to the abolition of
such conversion damages in 1988.59
As Borders did involve conversion of BALPC’s actual books
and not only the copyrighted interest, it might, indeed, readily be
distinguished from the situations normally envisaged by the 1988
Act. But, as in Borders we are not really dealing with adjudication
but with judicial legislation, this legislation would have beneﬁted
from consideration of the position taken on damages for
Hudson (ed.), New Perspectives on Property Law: Obligations and Restitution (London 2003),
ch. 14 and D. Campbell and S. Picciotto, ‘‘The Acceptable Face of Intervention: Intellectual
Property in Posnerian Law and Economics’’ (forthcoming 2006) Social and Legal Studies. In
the opinion of this author, still by far the most profound contribution to the discussion of
copyright is A. Plant, ‘‘The Economic Aspect of Copyright in Books’’ in Selected Economic
Essays and Addresses (London 1974), ch. 4.
56 R. Towse, Creativity, Incentive and Reward (Cheltenham 2001).
57 A. Schiﬀrin, The Business of Books (London 2000).
58 Report of the Committee to Consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (Chair Mr. Justice
Whitford) (Cmnd 6732 1977) para. 943 and e.g. Infabrics v. Jaytex [1982] A.C. 1.
59 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 170 and Sched. 1, para. 31(2).
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conversion in the law of copyright. These damages are, as a matter
of legislative history,60 intimately related to the present statutory
provision for damages in excess of the compensatory measure for
infringement of copyright. But there is no common law authority
for the award of exemplary damages for copyright infringement,
and so these should be ruled out under the cause of action test in
Rookes v. Barnard.61 There also is no settled authority that
exemplary damages can be awarded for infringement under the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, section 97(2),62 and the
leading work on the subject is of the opinion that they should not
be.63 It has also been held that normal compensatory damages
under section 96(2) of that Act, and ‘‘additional’’ damages under
section 97(2), are available only in the alternative to the account of
proﬁts eﬀectively granted in Borders.64
To draw all this to an end, it is necessary to say only that the
level of protection of copyright provided by the remedies regime
even after all these things are taken into account is regarded by our
leading intellectual property judges as already giving claimants
excessive rights,65 and that no-one who understands the issues can
think it an unambiguously good idea to grant remedies which
would move us towards making the intellectual property right really
absolute, for it is unarguable that the current formal system of
copyright is remotely tolerable only because its widespread
infringement is readily possible.66 Though what has been done in
Borders ﬁts the pattern in intellectual property cases of trying to
counter uncertainty of enforcement by the draconian quality of any
punishment actually meted out, it certainly is not the case that even
those to whom the terror weapon of punishment of this nature has
been extended are conﬁdent it will work. So prone to competitive
attack is the monopoly price that even a spokesperson of the
publishing company most aﬀected by Jordan’s operation has said
60 Whitford Committee, note 58 above, para. 704.
61 Law Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages (Consultation Paper
No. 132, 1993), paras. 3.55–3.64.
62 Law Commission, note 10 above, paras. 4.21 and 4.22. The previous position under The
Copyright Act 1956, s. 17(3) was discussed in Rookes v Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1225, and
in Broome v Cassell and Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1027, 1080, 1134, but these discussions were not,
of course, themselves discussed in Borders.
63 H. Laddie et al., The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, 3rd ed. (London 2000) para.
39.42. This paragraph of this excellent work could almost be quoted verbatim as a response to
what has been done in Borders.
64 Redrow Homes Ltd. v. Betts Bothers plc. [1999] 1 A.C. 197.
65 Hon. Sir Robin Jacob, ‘‘The Onward March of Intellectual Property Rights and Remedies’’ in
R.C. Dreyfuss et al. (eds.), Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (Oxford 2001),
ch. 17 and Mr. Justice Laddie, ‘‘Copyright: Over-strength, Over-regulated, Over-rated’’ (1996)
5 E.I.P.R. 253.
66 G.J. Sophar, ‘‘The Nature of the Problem’’ in L.H. Hattery and G.P. Bush (eds.),
Reprography and Copyright Law (Washington DC 1964), ch. 1.
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that ‘‘there’s some cynicism in the book industry that somebody
will ﬁll his shoes fairly quickly.’’67
In all these circumstances, the extension of a further remedy to
the claimant in Borders must appear a questionable policy. We do
not want to say what should be done, for we do not know. Why
the Court of Appeal thinks it does know is not a function of its
superior knowledge, for it made up its mind about what would be
just in a way which was itself unembarrassed by any real
understanding of the policy issues involved, or any real concern for
the proprieties of adjudication. For those wishing to mulct
defendants on this basis, it is extremely tempting to proceed on the
claimed authority of Blake, with the results of muddled law and ill-
judged policy which are becoming all too familiar.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Borders, the Court of Appeal has engaged in judicial legislation
which is unwise because the court does not understand the problem
for which it is trying to legislate. This, however, is not the main
point which we wish to make. In all areas of policy formulation,
not merely the law, the possibility of error such as that perpetrated
in this case emerges only because one gives up the restraints of
respect for previous wisdom and pursues abstract principle, in this
case ‘‘justice,’’ whatever that means. Common law adjudication is
meant to guard against the possibility of radical error of this sort,
but Borders is yet more evidence that the ﬁrst thing crushed in the
passage of the restitutionary juggernaut set in motion by Blake is
the legal respect for previous wisdom institutionalised in the
common law by precedent.
One looks in vain in Borders for an appreciation of the value of
the constraints imposed by precedent, even when one acknowledges
that this can play a positive role in appeal courts only when
sophisticatedly combined with a further appreciation of what can
be done to move beyond those constraints whilst still respecting
them. As the Court of Appeal does not just simply say what it
thinks is just and entirely ignore precedent, it would be wrong to
say that the court shows no feeling for common law adjudication
whatsoever. But the feeling it displays is vestigial. For, having
decided in advance that Jordan’s case had no merits, the court does
not seek to be guided by authority but interprets the authority
tendentiously, or ignores it, in order to realise an idea of justice
arrived at by some other means. In Borders, an ignorance of the
economic and legal policy issues raised by the case led the court to
67 Hanks, note 4 above.
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the erroneous belief that justice requires that Jordan be most
thoroughly mulcted. The nuanced balancing of the interests of the
claimant and the defendant which characterises the common law of
remedies for breach of obligations, and which is not entirely absent
even from the law of exemplary damages, which is the common law
of obligations’ poorest doctrine, is ironed out so that the law of
remedies may better serve only the claimant’s interests.
The result is bad law (adjudication) and bad policy ( judicial
legislation), and that one can say this in respect of even this
defendant tells us that something is going seriously wrong in the
course of the process of improving the position of the claimant on
the claimed authority of Blake. Who knows but that, at the end of
this process, the common law of remedies may well appear so
unnuanced, unbalanced and unfair that it may be thought to cry
out for an improvement which it is believed can be supplied only
by importing a respect for ‘‘proportionality’’ derived from the
European Convention on Human Rights.
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